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PROPOSED DRAFT FOR NSCIC WORKING GROUP CONSIDERATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Security Council Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT: India-Pakistan Crisis Study

1. Reference is the study, "Intelligence Support in Political-Military Crises: A Case Study of the India-Pakistan Crisis of 1971," and the 16 June 1972 transmittal memorandum of A. W. Marshall of the NSC Staff, under whose direction the study was accomplished.


2. Three areas of investigation raised in these papers are of particular import for future guidance of the intelligence community: the expression by policy levels of intelligence needs; the content and quality of the intelligence response; and the communication of intelligence output to key policy makers.

3. Expression by policy levels of intelligence needs

a. As the study clearly indicates, the process by which policy makers communicate their intelligence needs is multifaceted, ranging from requests as formal as those in NSSM directives to a multilevel network generating informal requests over which little control is exercised either by those in the consumer world or the responding intelligence organizations.

b. The study suggests that more attention to formal expression of intelligence needs is required, particularly at the outset of a crisis period, as guidance to intelligence on

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the issues which will require particular attention. A major problem is that formal need expression is time-consuming and the requirement for rapid response in a fast-moving crisis situation tends to result in request-response patterns which circumvent the formal structures. This informal channel is admittedly valuable, but it can result in confusion, lack of control, and, perhaps most important of all, a poorly organized sense of issues and direction.

c. Developments in the India-Pakistan crisis suggest that some type of focal point for the development, coordination and transmission of consumer intelligence needs to the intelligence community would improve intelligence responsiveness to important issues at the time they are of concern to policy levels of the government. This would not eliminate valuable informal expression and response channels, but would tend to reduce their use and provide improved focus for the intelligence effort.

4. Content and quality of the intelligence response

a. The amount of intelligence material communicated during the course of the crisis raises questions as to whether communications channels became clogged. Related issues are the amount of raw information which was forwarded and the probable need for more attention to coordinated intelligence community positions.

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b. Any attempt to delimit the amount of intelligence provided policy/operational levels could well prove counter-productive unless careful attention was given to controlling requests for intelligence as well. While the problem is real and must be kept constantly in mind, guidelines seeking to improve the situation in any future period of crisis will require more analysis than is provided by the single India-Pakistan study.

c. The matter of unfinished intelligence (raw information) reaching consumers could be accommodated if the users did not at times insist on receiving such and the intelligence organizations abstained from volunteering it. Further examination is required, but this may well be an area in which a clear guidance from the NSCIC could halt or at least reduce the flow of raw intelligence to policy levels in recognition that the evaluation responsibility should not be foregone by the intelligence community or accepted by analysts in policy organizations.

d. The study suggests a need for improved procedures for putting the coordinated views of the intelligence community on record, perhaps through greater use of NIE and SNIE publications during a crisis period. Such papers would have to be kept very brief and to the point to enhance their usefulness to policy makers and provide increased assurance that they will reach the decision makers for whom they are intended.

5. Communication of intelligence output to policy makers

The study puts considerable stress on the quantity of intelligence communications and the problems involved in assuring that key intelligence communications stand out above the noise level created by the high volume flow of materials. This is an extremely important problem and there may well be a need for some system of flagging top priority intelligence data and judgments for the attention of such key officials as members of the NSC, the NSCIC, the NSC Interdepartmental Group, and the Washington Special Action Group, particularly during crisis periods.

6. The India-Pakistan study and Mr. Marshall's transmittal memorandum already have been distributed to key elements of the intelligence production community for study. This present memorandum has been approved by members of the NSCIC Working Group and is available to all member organizations. It is the sense of the Working Group that specific guidance from the NSCIC should not be issued on the basis of this single study, but should await the completion of additional studies, such as that on the intelligence inputs to NSSM-69 and others expected to get underway shortly on the Arab-Israeli ceasefire of August 1970, the Jordan-Fedayeen civil war of September 1970, and [REDACTED] 719 of February-April 1971.

7. The Working Group recommends, therefore, that no action be taken by the NSCIC in response to the India-Pakistan study, but that the study be used by intelligence organizations as a report against which each of them can assess its own methods of operation and

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ability to respond to crisis requirements. Further recommendations for the issuance of specific NSCIC guidance will await completion of additional studies.

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